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PARTNERSHIP HOLDING OF REAL ESTATE
The association of partnership may be formed for
the carrying on of any commercial venture. But it need
not be so confined. I'n the early case of Kramer v Arthurs, Gibson, C. J., quotes Gow on Partnership saying,
"Partnerships are not necessarily confined to trades in
commercial ventures. They may lawfully exist in cases
unconnected with commercial speculations. For instance,
a partnership may exist between attorneys or farmers,
as well as between merchants or bankers", and continuing, the Chief Justice, in declaring that a partnership may exist to deal in lands, argues that it would be
absurd in law not to let partners give to land the attributes of a commodity, "especially in a country where
it is a chattel for payment of debts, and not unfrequently
a subject of speculation."
Twenty six years before in the celebrated case of
McDermot v Lawrence,2 Tilghman, C. J., had observed.
"Land, except for the purpose of erecting
necessary buildings, is not naturally an object
of trade or commerce, yet there is no doubt,
that by the agreement of the partners, it may
be brought into the stock, and considered as
7 Pa. 165. (1847).
"7 S. & R. 437. (1821).
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personal property, so far as concerns themselves, and their heirs and personal representatives."
Since those early days our cases have repeatedly held
that land may be the subject of partnership holding
whether necessary simply to the carrying on of the
particular business or incident thereto or where it furnishes the sole commodity dealt in by the association.

Firm Title--How Held
As we have seen in a previous article the common
law never has recognized the equitable or mercantile
concept of a partnership. "A partnership was not a person, but merely a group of individuals, each having his
individual name." 3
Hence the title to partnership
real estate could not be taken in the name of
the association, e. g., "The Pittsburgh Land Company", 4 or "The Middleton Oil Company" 5 or "American
Stave
and
Lumber
Company".6
These
words
were considered by the
common law judges
as
too vague and uncertain
to constitute a competent grantee at law, or a cestui que use whose estate the
statute would transfer into possession. The maxim id
certum est quod certum reddi potest would not be applied
to such cases of real estate altho it was repeatedly applied
7
where the holding involved merely personal estate.
Thus equity could recognize the holding in the latter case
but not in the former for the principle must be observed
that "equity follows the law". Despite this evidence as
much other which may occur to the reader, the judicial
myth, fathered by Lord Coke is still persisted in to this
day that the common law illustrates the perfection of
reason.
3

Mechem on Part. 2nd. Ed. P. 133.

4Kramer vs. Arthurs, Supra. N. 1.

5
Burns vs. McCabe. 72 Pa. 309. (1872). Per Williams, J.
GTrexlar vs. Africa, 42 Pa. Super. 542. (1910). Affirmed.
232 Pa. 493. (1911).
7Mechem. Supra. P. 132.
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The Unifortn Partnership act provides:
Section 8 (3) Any estate in real property
may be acquired in the partnership name. Title
so acquired can be conveyed only in partnership name."
Thus by legislative enactment it may now be judicially determined who comprise the name of the partnership thus enabling the. real title to be so held, for by the
terms of the Uniform Act the partners are co-owners of
the business, hence the legal title to property so held must
under the hypothesis be vested in the partners and not
in the name. Furthermore, the common law did not
recognize that real estate could be held by two or more
persons otherwise than as joint tenants, coparceners or
tenants in common.
However our Interstate Act
has
eliminated coparcenary estates by enacting
that when lands descend to several persons, they
shall take and hold as tenants in common.8
Therefore under our law where individuals are partners
and take title to real estate, they must hold either as joint
tenants or tenants in common. By the terms of the Act
of March 31st, 1812, as construed by our courts, joint tenancies have been turned into tenancies in common, except
as the proviso declares trust estates shall not be affected.
Says Mitchell :"
"Trust estates are expressly accepted,
therefore, the grant to two trustees and their
heirs, without more, vests an estate in joint
tenancy in them and survivorship is incident."
If the deed of conveyance is to the partners to hold
as such, it should be clearly stated so, e. g. "to Augustus
Holmes, James Myers and John Strimpler, trading under
the firm of Holmes, Myers & Co.," apearing in a
sheriff's deed, it was held to stamp legally the real
estate conveyed as partnership property, altho the haben820 R. C. L., 850: Mitchell, Real Estate and Conveyancing.
P. 255.
9

Mitchell, Supra. P. 251: Kennedy's Appeal, 60 Pa. 511. (1869).
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dum clause recited that the grant was "unto the said
Augustus Holmes, James Myers and John Strimpler, etc.,
their heirs and assigns". Said Coulter, J :10
"But it is alleged that the habendum is "to
them, their heirs and assigns forever", and that
this makes it a tenancy in common. But this is
a misapprehension. The premises are used to
set forth the names of the parties. Then follows the certainty of the grantee, and the thing
granted: 2 B. .298. So in this case, the certainity
of the grantee, to wit: the firm or partnership
is orderly set out. But the office of the habendum is not to designate the grantee, but to determine the amount of the estate or interest
granted by the deed, whether for life in tail or
in fee simple".
The deed then was not a deed to the members of the
firm as tenants in common but as partners of the
partnership of Holmes, Myers & Co., and a judgment
entered against John Strimpler after the conveyance
was not a lien against the legal title. Consequently a
mortgage made by the partnership to Lancaster Bank
subsequent to the above judgment was not affected by
it and upon foreclosure the holders of the mortgage were
held to be entitled to the proceeds. Likwise a deed conveying land to "Henry J. Meily, James P. Witherow, John
Meily and Lyman Nutting" partners doing business
under the firm name of "Meily & Company," it being
further set forth that the above described persons were
to hold said property "as partnership property", was
held to vest the title in the partners for the benefit of
the firm. A judgment against a member of the firm did
not become a lien against the firm's legal title and in conveying the partnership passed a title free of this claim.11
The interest of each partner in the partnership real
20 Lancaster Bank vs. Myley, 13 Pa. 544.
12Meily vs. Wood, 71 Pa. 488. (1872.)

(1850).
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estate, like in other partnership property, is a residual
one, ascertainable only by an accounting, hence the legal
title to the firm real estate could not be bound by the lien
of judgment of a partner's separate creditor. On the
contrary a judgment against the partners as a firm will
be a lien on not only the real estate held by them as a
firm but also against the real estate held in their
separate estates and will be superior to the lien of a
judgment subsequently entered against one of the
partners as to real estate separately owned by him.
In Salter v Acker, 13 a partner executed a declaration of trust reciting that "said premises were purchased for James F. Donohue and the said Walter D.
Gibney, trading as Donohue & Gibney, undertakers",
further acknowledging that he held the title "as trustee
for himself the said Walter D. Gibney and the said James
F. Donohue, in equal shares, as tenants in common", it
was held that the real estate in question was not partnership property, but the holding was as tenants in common.
As the partners in the case of partnership holding
of real property,, under the decisions, are not tenants
in common and the property so held is admittedly for
the use and benefit of the partners collectively under
the designation of a firm, a concept at least recognizable by the courts of equity, it would appear that at law
the partners held title as joint tenants and trustees
under the proviso of the Act of March 31st, 1812,14
already referred to, which holding would be in analogy
to their holding of the personal property of the firm with
the benefit of survivorship in the personal representative of a partner in case of death, but our courts have
reached no such conclusion directly although as we shall
12Cumming's Appeal, 25 Pa. 268. (1855).
1362 Pa. Sup. 207 (1916).
uSee Appeal of Carlisle, 9 Watts 331, (1840); R. R. Co. vs.
Navigation Co., 36 Pa. 204 (1860).
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point out, they have practically reached this end through
the doctrine of equitable conversion.

Equitable Conversion
In McDermot v Lawrence5S a case where the title
was held by the partners as tenants in common, Tilghman, C. J., declared, "there is no doubt, that by the agreement of the partners, it (the real estate) may be brought
into the stock, and considered as personal property, so
far as concerns themselves, and their heirs and personal
representatives", citing some English as well as American cases, for the doctrine. Gibson, C. J., in Kramer v
Arthurs 8 refers to the same teaching concerning
partnership land saying, "When it is brought into a concern as stock, it is, as between the partners and a person
who has knowingly dealt with one of them for it, to be
treated as personal estate belonging, not to the partners
individually, but to the company collectively".
This
doctrine is adverted to or dwelt upon in all of the subsequent cases as an essential principle of this branch of
partnership.Says Mechem:'18
'For the purpose of facilitating the administration and application of partnership
realty to partnership purposes, the fiction of
an equitable conversion into that form, to wit,
personalty, into which it must ultimately be converted in order to be so applied has been established. This conversion is deemed to result
from the devotion of the land to the uses of the
partnership, though there is not entire agree"5Supra. Note 2.
2Supra. Note 1.
'?Lancaster Bank vs. Myley, Supra. Note 10; Moderwell vs.
Mullison, 21 Pa., 275. (1853). Mining Assoc. vs. Reed, 80 Pa. 38
(1875); Collner vs. Greig, 137 Pa. 606. (1890).
28 Elements Part 2nd Ed., p. 144.
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ment as to the extent to which it will be carried.
The English rule is that of "out and out" or
complete conversion, and regards partnership
realty as partnership capital and as having in
all respects the character of personal property,
but the American rule is otherwise".
Our own cases, after some hesitation, have finally
leaned to the complete conversion view.
In Meily v Wood,'19 Sharswood, J. declared:
"There is such an out and out conversion
when a sale is directed absolutely by deed or
will; for equity will consider that as actually
done which is agreed or directed to be done.
So in the case of land agreed to be made partnership stock, there is of necessity an out-and-out
conversion".
In a very recent case 20 Walling, J., said:
"Whether partnership real estate shall be
treated as real or personal property depends
largely upon the intention of the parties."
"Here the intent that it shall be personal
property clearly appears in that the deed is
made to the partners as a firm and not as individuals, or as tenants in common, and in that
it is therein designated as partnership property for the use of the firm".
In determining the form of title by which partners
hold real property, it is not clear that the doctrine of
equitable conversion-a pure fiction-is of any practical
utility, except possibly that it tends to emphasize the
fact that the title is being held, not for the benefit of the partners as individuals, but in their collective capacity, or as popularly said "for the use of the
firm". The partners, therefore, hold at law either as
2971 Pa. 494 (1872); accd. DuBree vs. Albert, 100 Pa. 483,

(1882).
2oHall's Estate, 266 Pa. 312, (1920).
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trustees for the benefit of the firm or it must be said
the Courts have devised a holding, unknown to the law,
designated as a partnership holding.
Happily, the question has been solved by the legislature in the recent Uniform Partnership Act by recognition of a new form of holding by tenancy in partnership. Section 25 provides:
"A partner is co-owner with his partners
of specific partnership property, holding as a
tenant in partnership".

Descent and Distribution

In Foster's Appeal, 21 Sharswood, J., who had
already declared 22 the doctrine of out-and-out conversion of land held in partnership, reiterates the same
but presents a qualification in these words:
"When the purpose of conversion is attained, conversion ends, or more accurately, reconversion takes place. Thus when the sale
under the trust is made, the character of personalty does not follow the land into the hands of
the purchaser. The proceeds are personalty
and are distributed as such among the cestuis
que trust, because that was the very object of
the conversion. So with land in partnership
when sold by the firm, the land becomes land
again in the hands of the purchaser and the
proceeds personalty, but personalty to what extent? Only to the extent of accomplishing the
purpose of the conversion, namely, the equity of
the partners to have the joint debts and their
own advances paid before any part goes to the
other partners or tlbeir separate creditors."
The conclusion of the learned justice is that any
balance of the proceeds of partnership land sold to pay
partnership debts and advances remaining unapprop2174 Pa. 398. (1873).
22 Meily vs. Wood, Supra. N. 19.
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riated for these purposes is in fiction converted back
into land and distributable as such.2 3 Therefore the
widow of a deceased partner of a firm dealing in coal
lands, "in many instances the real estate belonging to
said firm" having been conveyed to the partners as
tenants in common, was merely entitled to dower rather
than an absolute interest in the proceeds derived from
the sale of her husband's share by order of Orphan's
Court, the surviving partner purchasing said share and
assuming all firm indebtedness and liabilities.
In Haeberly's Appeal, 24 Mitchell, J., referring to
prior cases and the "out-and-out conversion" doctrine,
opined that the phrase was "unfortunate",
and "apt
to mislead". In this case the net real estate of a partnership, which sold out completely to a corporation, receiving in consideration therefore cash, stocks and bonds,
was held distributable as real estate. It is apparent from
a reading of later decisions and upon principle that both
Foster's Appeal and Haeberly's Appeal were wrongly
decided when the actual facts involved are considered.
In Foster's Appeal the court was confessedly of
opinion that conversion was to be deemed at an end upon
payment of the firm's debts and advances to partners
and in Haeberly's Appeal the fact that there were no
partnership debts seemed to eliminate the conversion
doctrine. In both cases, however, the facts were intricate and obviously conversion of very necessity must
have been "out-and-out". What would a partnership accounting show? The order of distribution of assets
would be as follows: (1) partnership debts, (2) ad2

3The precise question as stated by the court was confined

to what might be left in specie.

The conclusion stated above ac-

cords with the weight of American cases but not those of outand-out conversion.

Mechem, Supra. P. 148.

Pa. 248 (1899). The question assumed to be before
the court was as narrowly confined as in Foster's Appeal. It is
submitted that the facts of neither case, warranted such a narrowing of the question.
24191
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vances to partners, (3) return to partners of capital
stock contribution, (4) distribution of surplus. 25 This
order can only be observed by a reduction of the partnership assets to cash and the share of each partner in the
balance is always personal estate, 26 except in the cases
where assets remain in specie and there is an agreement
by the partners to divide or partition in specie. In the
latest expression by our Supreme Court, the cases referred to, altho not specifically overruled, are confined
to very narrow limits, Walling, J., saying :27
'True it has been held that after a partnership is dissolved and all its affairs closed and
indebtedness liquidated, the property remaining in kind will resume its original form and so
pass to the individual partners, their heirs or
legal representatives. To that effect are Foster's Appeal, 74 Pa. 391, and Haeberley's Appeal, 191 Pa. 239. That rule has been more uniformly held applicable to real estate conveyed
to the individual partners and treated as firm
property for certain purposes only, in other
words, where there was merely a quasi conversion."2s

As already pointed out. the Uniform Partnership
Act, in the holding of partnership property, creates the
new tenancy in partnership, one of the stipulated incidents being that the partner's right in specific partnership property "is not subject to dower, curtesy, or al23 Such is the order in the Uniform Part. Act, Sec. 40-B. The
partners are entitled to a return of capital and profits, as well
as to have other liabilities paid.
2LtUniform Part. Act, Sec. 26.
27
Hall's Estate, 266 Pa. 316, (1920). The court refused to

consider the application of the Uniform Part. Act or its constitutionality.
28
See also Leaf's App., 105 Pa. 505. (1884); Warriner vs.
Mitchell, 128 Pa. 153; Collner vs. Greig, 137 Pa. 606; Hays vs.

Treat, 178 Pa. 310; Ihmsen vs. Huston, 47 Pa. 402.
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iowances to widows, heirs, or next of kin." The partner's
interest in the partnership is also described as personal
property. 9 These sections, together with Section 38.
(1) of the Act, embody a recognition of the doctrine of
"out-and-out" conversion, thus molding our law in harmony with the current of decisions of our Supreme Court
according to the best and latest expressions of that body
upon this subject.8 0

Tenancies in Common
Rights of Separate Creditors
A and B engage in partnership, e. g., in the livery
business. A piece of land is acquired with partnership
funds and used for partnership purposes, but the
title is taken in the names of both partners as tenants in
common. X, a separate creditor of A, obtains judgment.
Is the record title bound by the lien of the judgment as
to A's undivided one-half interest, assuming further that
X knew the above facts at the time of the entry of the
judgment?
Says Sergeant, J :31
"The title set up by the defendant professes to be paramount to that of Henrie in his
separate capacity, and to defeat the plaintiff's
execution, by showing that, although the deed
to Copp and Henrie was to them as tenants in
common, and, therefore, on its face, each held
an individual moiety; yet, in fact, they held the
property as partners, pledged to partnership
creditors, in exclusion of the plaintiff, who was
a separate creditor of one partner. Such a trust
or ownership of property is inconsistent with
the title on record, which is vested in them
as tenants in common. To permit a person, apparently owning property as an individual to
aver a different right in himself as partner,
29

Sec. 25-E; Sec. 26.

3OThe English Part. Act of 1890 is to the same effect.
31

Hale vs, Henrie, 2 Watts, 145 (1834).
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by which his relations to creditors and others,
are to be affected, would defeat the statute of
frauds and perjuries, by which no interest in
real estate (except a lease for a short period)
can vest or be transferred, without deed or
writing. It would even be worse than to pass
real estate without writing; since a deed would
thus express one thing and mean another; and
our recording acts, instead of being guides to
truth would be no better than snares".
In Lefevre's Appeal 32 Sharswood, J., declares the
law to be "that as to strangers,-purchasers, mortgagees
and creditors,-the agreement of partners to make real
estate part of the common stock must be evidenced by
writing, and that it ought to be put on record, so as to
give notice to the world; otherwise, where the deed is
in their individual names they will hold as tenants in
common." In this case, the deed to the partners was in
their individual names but was not recorded. The property was used for partnership purposes and some of
the improvements had been paid for out of partnership
funds. It was held that the fund arising from a
sheriff's sale of the property was properly distributed
to the individual creditors of the partners.
In Ebbert's Appeal,- the title to the land in question stood in the names of "Goddard L. Ebbert and
Ardel Maclind", as tenants in common and it was held
that as between partnership and separate creditors having liens the record title would prevail. Said Agnew, J.,:
"It is certainly determined in a long train
of decisions, that as to purchasers of the title
and creditors having liens on it, a deed to persons who are in fact partners, but who take the
title to themselves as tenants in common, must
3269 Pa. 122 (1871). Cf. remarks Tilghman, C. J., McDermot vs. Lawrence, 7 S. & R., 437 (1821).
3370 Pa. 81 (1871).
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stand as the foundation of their rights, and govern in the distribution of the proceeds of a sale
of the title. Partnership creditors cannot by
parol evidence change the effect of the deed, and
convert lands so individually held into assets of
the partnership, and thereby dislodge and postpone the otherwise preferred liens of individual
creditors".
The land in this case was purchased with partnership funds and was used for partnership purposes, "but
it nowhere appeared in the deed, nor could it be discovered in any way from it, that the lots were so paid for or
so to be used".
In Lancaster Bank v Myley,- a case where the title
to the land was in the partnership by a sheriff's deed and
recorded as provided then by law in the Prothonotary's
Office,--Coulter, J., argues as follows:
"It is also true that when parties intend to
bring real estate into a partnership stock, that
such intention must be manifested by writing
placed on record. Because under the statute
of frauds all contracts respecting real estate
must be in writing, saving only those exceptions which have been made by the courts, of
whieh lhis is not one" This is a singular piece of
reasoning showing confusion of thought as to
the import of the statute of frauds with the scope
of the recording acts. 35
In Ridgway, Budd & Cos. Appeal' 6 decided the
same year, we find Rogers, J., making the same statement
without assigning any reason other than citing Lancaster Bank v Myley:
'113 Pa. 549.

(1850).

a3This dictum was echoed by Sharswood, J., in Lefevre's App.
Supra. N. 32, saying the agreement "must be in writing and
ought to be recorded."
3615 Pa. 181 (1850).
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"When partners intend to bring real estate
into partnership, their intention must be manifested by deed or writing, placed on record, that
purchasers may not be deceived".
The head note of Gunnison v Loan Co., 37 reiterates
a similar statement taken from a review of all the cases
to date by Dean, J., not at all essential however to deciding the case, the facts being that by agreement with
his co-partner Kepler took title to the premises, paid for
by the partnership, as a matter of convenience in handling, the firm being engaged in the real estate business.
A judgment was entered against Kepler by the Loan
Company. The deed had been recorded over four years
prior to the entry of the judgment. Later the firm
made an assignment for the benefit of creditors and at
the same time executed and placed on record a declaration, acknowledged by both, that the premises in question, as well as other lands, had been purchased by them
as partnership property. Held that the facts came within the ruling of Hale v Henrie.
The latest expression of the Supreme Court upon
this ruling is found in the case of Gwinner v Union
Trust Co.381 These were the facts. A and B made a
joint purchase of land in Pittsburgh for subdivision into
building lots, the same to be sold upon joint account.
The title to the land was taken in the name of A. Notes
were given jointly, endorsed for accomodation by the
plaintiff and discounted at several banks, the avails being
applied to the purchase price of the land. Later B died,
after which A made an assignment for the benefit of
creditors and subsequently died. The plaintiff was compelled to take up the notes and filed a bill to have the
fund raised from the sale of the land by the assignee
declared a partnership fund and also for the appointment
37157 Pa. 303 (1893).
3S226 Pa. 614 (1910). The decree of the lower court was affirmed in a short Per Curiam.
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of a receiver. Frazer, P. J., found as a fact that there
was no partnership of A and B relative to this land, on
the evidence, and entered a decree dismissing the bill,
saying however:
'But whether the testimony does or does not establish a partners-hip in this case, we think is immaterial in determining the case. While it is
true a partnership may exist for the purpose
of purchasing a tract of land and selling it out
in lots, the land will not take the form of
partnership property, except as between the
partners, unless the deed or some other writing
of record gives notice of that fact. This is
undoubtedly the law in this state, and has been
so declared in an unbroken line of cases beginning with Hale v Henrie, 2 Watts. 143 and continuing down to the present time".
In view of the finding that there was no evidence
of partnership the above expression is mere dictum.
There were, furthermore, no lien creditors in this case
and if the above statement would be applied on the assumption that there was a partnership, the facts would
fall within the ruling of Gunnison v Loan Co.,39 extended
to the case of unsecured creditors.
It is submitted
that this construction would be an unwarranted extension of the doctrine Df Hale v. Henrie and unsupported
by the authorities. Said Buffington, Dis. J., in In ReGrotzinger :40
"A careful study of all the Pennsylvania
cases shows that no decision of that state goes
to the length of holding that, where the recorded
title of real estate owned by a firm is allowed
to stand in the name of an individual member
of the firm, it will be applied to the payment of
unsecured individual creditors of such partner".
3oSupra. N. 37.
40110 F. 366 (1901).
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It is further submitted that the doctrine of Hale v
Henrie, based upon an erroneous application of the
Statute of Frauds,4 1 ought not to be extended beyond

its express terms, i. e. that where partners hold real
estate as tenants in common or where with the assent
of the co-partner a partner holds as an individual the
legal title to lands, as against a separate judgment
creditor of a partner, parol evidence is inadmissible to
show that the real estate is partnership property, despite
the fact also that the land was purchased with partnership funds and used for partnership purposes. It is
immaterial whether the deed is recorded, if as a fact at
the time of the entry of the judgment the title is in
the partners as tenants in common. Conversely, if
by articles of co-partnership or by a declaration of trust
there is compliance with the Statute of Frauds and the
real estate by the terms of the written instrument is partnership property, it is immaterial whether the said instrument is recorded or not, as far as the rights of judgment
creditors are concerned. The recording acts, in spite
of the express terms of the legislature, have never been
construed by the courts as protecting other than purchasers and mortgagees.4 2

Equitable Titles

A land company or partnership appointed by articles
W and H as agents to purchase, sell, exchange and mortgage real estate in its behalf, titles to be taken by said
agents absolutely but they were immediately to execute a
declaration of trust in favor of the partnership, the same
however not to be recorded. The agents entered into a
contract for the purchase of a piece of land with Lee,
agent for Luckey. W retired, transferring his interest
4125 R. C. L., Sec. 380, also Sec. 386, 20 Cvc. 306. Cf.
Christy vs. Brien, 14 Pa. 248. (1850). Houser vs. Lamont, 55 Pa.
311, (1867). See also 25 Dick. Law Rev. 63 and authorities there

cited for further confusion on Stat. Frds.
42

Rogers vs. Gibson, 4 Yeates, 111. (1804); Cadbury vs. Duval,

5 Clarke, 206. (1852); Davy vs. Ruffell, 162 Pa. 443. (1894); Rosa
vs. Hummel, 252 Pa. 578. (1916), changed as to resulting trusts;
Smith vs. Young, 259 Pa. 367. (1918). For history of recording see

Read, J., Luck's app. 44 Pa. 523 (1863).
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to H who paid the purchase money to Luckey. H sold the
premises to S who directed a conveyance to P and Luckey
so conveyed. Before said conveyance but after the contract made by Lee with W & H, a creditor of the latter
obtained judgment against W & H growing out of a debt
separately due from W & H to said creditor. It was
held, 43 per Gibson, C. J. that this judgment was not
a lien upon the equitable title.
"Had the legal title and consequent indices
of ownership been in W & H at the time of the
sheriff's sale, the plaintiffs, paying their money
in ignorance of the defendants or the company's
interest, would have been entitled to the character of purchasers without notice. The case
would have fallen within the principle of Hale v
Henrie, 2 Watts, 145 .....
.But, in the case at
bar, the legal title was neither bound nor sold,
for it never was in the debtors; and, without
gross supineness, the purchasers could not have
been deceived as to the quality of their estate
or the extent of their interest".
The interest of W. & H. in the premises was an
equitable one, held in trust, however, for the benefit of
the land company, consequently this interest was not
bound by the lien of the judgment. It is true that in
Pennsylvania any interest whatsoever, legal or equitable,
vested or contingent, of a debtor in lands is bound by the
lien of a judgment entered against him46 but such judgment nevertheless only binds the actual interest the debt47
or may have.

Constructive Trusts
A and B are partners in the lumber business and as
such buy large tracts of timber land. It is found desirable, in fact, necessary, for the partnership to purchase
an outstanding title to the above lands. A purchases this
43Kramer vs. Arthurs, 7 Pa. 165. (1847).
46 Carkhuff vs. Anderson, 3 Binn 4 (1810).
47Lichty vs. Hager, 13 Pa. 568. (1850).
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title paying his own separate funds down as handmoney
and takes the contract in his own name. Held that the
purchase is for the benefit of the firm. Says Strong, J:48
"And if it had been the fact that his funds
were separately raised and kept, and if he did
apply to the purchase that which was exclusively
his own, such was his relation to Lacy and the
property that he could not appropriate to himself the entire advantage of his bargain... It is
true this is not the case of a resulting trust
growing out of the payment of the purchase
money. It is rather a constructive trust which
equiy declares to arise from the relative situation and conduct of the parties."
A title so held would not be bound by the lien of a
judgment against the holder thereof and would fall within the exceptions to Hale v Henrie. It has been held
that such a trust would not be within the 4th section of
the Statute of Frauds Act of April 22nd, 1856. 49

Resulting Trusts
Imhoff and Myers were partners in the distilling
business. Myers purchased a I ot adjoining the distilery with partnership funds and for partnership purposes but took title to the lot in his own name. D 'recovered judgment against Imhoff and later Erwin and
several others obtained judgments against the partnership by confession of the partner Myers.
The lot was
sold on the latter judgments and the question of distribution of proceeds arose. The auditor awarded the proceeds as though the lot was separate estate, awarding onehalf to D and on the ground that the lot was not necessary for partnership purposes altho purchased with
48Lacy vs. Hall, 37 Pa. 360. (1860); Duff vs. Wilson, 72 Pa.
442 (1872). A case of co-tenancy, Johnson's Appeal, 115 Pa. 129

(1886).
49Seichrist's Appeal, 66 Pa. 237 (1870).
vendee under articles.

Grantee holding for
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partnership funds. In reversing the judgment Strong, J.
said :50
"Had the title been taken to both Imhoff
and Myers, without any assertion on its face
that it was treated by them as partnership
property, under the ruling in Hale v Henrie, 2
Watts, 143, and several subsequent cases, they
would have been but tenants in common. The
absence of such an assertion would have been
evidential that the' partners did not intend to
bring the property into partnership stock, but
that they intended to take separate interests.
But the legal title was conveyed to Jacob Myers
alone. We are now looking for the use, with
the intention to buy for the firm, with nothing to
indicate a severance of interests, and with the
fact that the joint funds paid for the lot, it
must be that the beneficial interest was in the
firm as such."
In later cases the facts of Erwin's Appeal are interpreted as those of a resulting trust and hence not
within the ruling of Hale vs. Henrie. Says Sharswood,
J.,5 referring to Erwin's Appeal:
"The principle of these cases was that such
a purchase by one partner raised a resulting
trust which was within the exceptions of the
Statute of Frauds, and that the former cases
grounded upon the provisions of that statute
did not apply."
Hence, if the legal title to partnership property is
taken in the name of one partner with the assent of
the others a resulting trust will not arise and no constructive trust will be invoked against the claim of a
separate judgment creditor. e. g. Hayes and Kepler
were engaged as partners dealing in real estate. For
5oErwin's Appeal, 39 Pa. 535 (1861). See also Erwin vs.
Myers, 46 Pa. 96, (1863). Lefevre's Appeal, 69 Pa. 125 (1871).
5Olefevre's Appeal, Supra. Note 32.
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convenience titles to land were taken sometimes in the
name of one partner, sometimes in the name of the
other. Kepler took title to the premises in question
and later a judgment was entered against him by the
Loan Co.

Said Dean, J., 2

"By formal deed, Hayes and Kepler represented this property to the public as Kepler's
individually; then, after Kepler had obtained
the loan from the bank, and judgment on it was
entered, it is attempted by parol to change the
nature of the property; it is no longer land
but personalty; it is land for borrowing on a
judgment note, but is personalty, not the subject of a judgment lien, when it comes to paying.
The very object of the deed to one
member, instead of to the partnership, was to
have the title appear to the public to be wholly
Kepler's, to facilitate dealing with it. Now,
then, can this case be an exception to the statute of frauds because of a resulting trust ?"
The learned court in answer to this question held
there was no resulting trust and the case was within
the ruling of Hale v Henrie.
3
Act of 1901.5

By the terms of this act resulting trusts "shall be
void and of none effect as to bonafide judgment or
other creditors, or mortgagees of the holder of the legal
title, or purchasers from such holder without notice, unless either (1) a declaration of trust in writing has
been executed and acknowledged by the holder of the
legal title, and recorded in the recorder's office of the
county where the land is situated, or (2) unless an action of ejectment has been begun, in the proper coun32Gunnison vs. Loan Co., 157 Pa. 310. (1893).
5'Act of June 4th, 1901, P. L. 425, Sec. 1.
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ty, by the person advancing the money, against the
holder of the legal title."
It was held in Rosa vs. Hummel " that this act had
no application to any other resulting trusts than such as
arise by reason of the payment of purchase money. Said
Potter, J.,
"Counsel for appellant contend it was not
intended that the Act of 1901 should be limited
to a single class of trusts, arising only by reason of the payment of purchase- money, but that
it was intended to apply to all resulting trusts;
we cannot, however, so read the statute. Both
in the title and in the body of the act, its
operation is expressly limited to trusts which
arise from the payment of purchase-money.
However beneficial it might be, to extend the
scope of the law, as suggested by counsel for appellant, such relief should come from the legislature, rather than through a forced construction of the statute by the courts."

Partners Inter Se
A, B, C and D, purchased land but took title as
tenants in common. After the death of one partner a
mortgage previously given upon this land to secure purchase money was foreclosed and upon distribution of
the balance accruing after payment of liens the question
arose whether the balance was to be distributed as separate estate of each partner or to the surviving partners
engaged in settling the partnership affair. The auditor
awarded the fund to the surviving partner and on appeal this was affirmed. Read, J. saying: 55
"But the cases of Hale vs. Henrie; Ridgway
Budd & Co's. Appeal, 3 Harris, 181, and the
language of Coulter, J., in Lancaster Bank vs.
Myley, 1 Harris, 549, all relate to purchasers
and creditors and not to the partners themselves
considered as menrbers of the firm. Our re•4252 Pa. 578, (1916).
55Abbott's Appeal, 50 Pa. 234, (1865).
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cording act affects purchasers and creditors but
does not, independent of them, disturb the actual
relations of the partners to each other in respect of partnership property, whether real or
personal."
In Hays vs. Treat,5 the widow and heirs of a partner sought by ejectment to recover froan a vendee of the
personal representatives of the deceased partners, who
sold the land in question as partnership property altho,
the legal title had been vested in the partners as tenants
in common, but paid for with partnership funds and
used for partnership purposes. The court, after observing that the question did not involve creditors either of
the firm or the individual members of it but was raised
by those claiming under the deceased partner stated the
rule as folows:
"The general rule is that if the real estate
is bought with partnership funds and for part
nership purposes, it is partnership property notwithstanding the deed may be made to the individuals of whom the firun is composed. Rates on
Vhe Law -of Partnership, par. 280. Our own cases
holding this general doctrine are numerous and
consistent. In Erwin's Appeal, 39 Pa. 535, the
title was in the name of one of the partners,
but the lot had been bought for partnership purposes and paid for out of partnership moneys.
For some reason it had not been used by the
firm, but it was held to be partnership property,
and its proceeds were distributed among partnership creditors in preference to 7the creditors
of the grantee named in the deedA
So in Abbott's Appeal, 50 Pa. 234, this was the
only question raised, and we said that the presumption arising from the fact that deed was
56178 Pa. 310 (1896), per Williams, J.
slThe learned court was mistaken in this statement.
held the title but the judgment was against Imhoff.

Myers
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to Ithe intviddal partners was rebutted by the
facts that the land was bought for partnership
purposes and paid for with partnership
funds. Under such a state of facts the grantees named in the deed take the legal title in
trust for their firm which pays the purchase
money and for whose use the purchase is made.
To the same effect is Meason vs. Kaine, 63
Pa. 335. West Hickory Mining Association vs.
Reed, 80 Pa. 38, Shafer's Appeal, 106 Pa. 49,
state the rule very fully, and that payment of
the purchase money out of the partnership
funds for property bought for firm uses rebuts
the presumption arising from a deed to the
individual members of the finm. Warriner vs.
Mitchell et al, 128 Pa. 153, makes the distinction
between a contest made by creditors and one
made by the partners with each other. In the
latter case it was held that land bought with
partnership funds, used for partnership purposes, and treated as partnership property is
partnership assets notwithstanding the title may
be held by the individual partners. The same
rule was stated in Collner vs. Greig, et al., 137
Pa. 606."
If the purchase as made by the partner with the
funds of the partnership was not for purposes of the
partnership, the legal title, altho held by the grantee in
trust, will not be so held for the benefit of the firm but
of the individual cnibers. In Coder vs. Huling, 58 C. & H.
were partners. C with partnership funds purchased real
estate not necessary for the partnership business. It
was decided that C was holder of the legal title in trust
for hims3elf and H as tenants in commnon, hence a judgment confessed by C for a partnership claim would not
5827 Pa. 84 (1856).
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bind the interest of H in the land in question. 9 A sale
by the sheriff under such judgment would not effect H's
interest and the latter properly recovered against the
purchasers in ejectment for the individual one-half interest.

Uniform Act
Section 8, (1), (2), provides as follows:
"All property originally brought into the
partnership stock or subsequently acquired, by
purchase or otherwise, on account of the partnership is partnership property.
Unless the contrary intention appears,
property acquired with partnership funds is
partnership property."
In so far as these provisions apply to the holding
of land they must be read in the light of Hale vs. Henrie
and the cases already discussed under that ruling and
the exceptions thereto.

Statute of Frauds
A and B entered into an agreement with C to purchase from the latter a tract of land for a certain price.
Later D agreed verbally with A and B that if they would
procure a conveyance of the tract to him from C, he
would pay the whole purchase money and in case of a
resale would give A and B one-third of the profits. A
and B performed their part D receiving the conveyance
and paying the purchase price. Later D resold at a profit
but refused to give A and B their share as agreed. Upon
assumpsit brought it was held that the statute of frauds
is no bar to a recovery. The contract sued upon was not
for land purchased but for profits growing out of the
5 9Judgment may be confessed against the firm-by a partner
but it only binds firm property. Grier vs. Hood, 25 Pa. 430;
Walsh vs. Kirby, 228 Pa. 194 (1910). Contra Uniform Act, Sec.
9, (3)-D.
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sale of land. An interest in contingent profits arising
from a sale to be thereafter made does not give an interest in the land itself and these facts relieve the case
from the operation of the statute of frauds. 60 An agreement, therefore, to form a partnership to engage in the
buying and selling of land, is not such a contract as falls
within the terms of the statute of frauds and must .be
in writing. Says Phillips,: J.,61
"There is a wide distinction, however, between an agreement for one to become interested in the profits of certain land already purchased and owned by another and an agreement
to share in the benefits to be derived from lands
to be thereafter acquired."
In McCormick's Appeal 2, B owned a mill and lands
and formed a partnership with F. It was agreed by
parol that the mill should be part of the partnership
estate and F paid B part of the consideration in cash
and the balance was to be paid out of profits F went
into possession with B and improvements to the real
estate were made out of firm funds involving a large
sum of money. No deeds were ever made by B who
later died. It was held that the title to the mill and
lands did not pass to the firm. Said Strong, J.,:
"Undoubtedly a partnership may hold real
estate and they may have a resulting trust,
when the partnership funds have paid for the
land. Such was the case of Erwin's Appeal,
3 Wright 535. So, there may be a constructive
trust in favor of a firm, as was held in Lacy
vs. Hall. I Wright 360, but these come within
the exception to the Statute of Frauds. In both
these cases the lands were acquired after the
partnership had been formed, and while the
60Benjamin vs. Zell, 100 Pa. 33 (1882).
O"Goldstein vs. Nathan, 158 Ill. 641 (1895).
6257

Pa. 54. (1868).
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joint business was in progress.
But here
there is no resulting or constructive trust, the
agreement, if there was any, to put the land into
the joint stock was made before the firm had
any being, and the partnership funds did not
pay for it. A parol agreement to put land into
a firm, or to consider it as firm property, made
before the firm exists, is wholly ineffectual to
pass any title either in law or in equity."
In Everhart's Appeal,es, the reporter's head note
states that when a partnership is formed for the purpose of buying and selling lands, one of the partners
cannot establish his interest in such lands by parol evidence, when the other sets up the Statute of Frauds requiring agreements relating to lands to be in writing.
The statement is misleading because the plaintiff recovered his interest in such lands as were purchased and sold
on account of the partnership, his interest being his
agreed share in the profits of the sales. The right of
recovery as made was dinied as far as plaintiffs interest
in the farm was concerned, apparently, because the agreement to make the farm partnership property was by
parol and consequently within the ruling of McCormick's Appeal, 4 but the plaintiff was permitted to recover his share of the profits of the farm according to
the agreement. The Court approved of and followed
the case of Benjamin vs. Zell 65 In Howell vs. Kelly 68,
which was a case of a partnership, founded on a parol
contract, formed to procure options on and sell as one
tract certain coal lands, the court permitted one partner to recover from his co-partner the share of profits
due under the agreement. Counsel had cited Everhart's
Appeal for the reporter's statement already quoted. In
a Per Curiam this is disposed of by the court declaring:
63106 Pa. 349 (1884).
6457 Pa. 54. (1868).

85100 Pa. 33, (1882).
88149 Pa. 473, (1892).
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"It would be a novel doctrine to hold that a partnership
agreement must be in writing because the subject matter of the partnership was dealing in real estate."
67
Says Mechem:
"Such contracts are neither contracts for
the sale of any land nor do they create interests
or estates in any particular lands. That question will only arise when land is thereafter acquired. If a valid partnership has been created,
and thereafter partnership funds are used to
purchase land, the title to which is taken in one
partner, or if a partner in such a partnership
purchase for himself land which it wag his duty
to purchase for the partnership, a trust may
be established upon a showing of the facts by
parol evidence notwithstanding the statute"
It is believed that this expression correctly represents the result of our cases as they have been reviewed.
A. J. WHITE HUTON.

6t

Elements of Part. 2nd Ed. Par. 61.
Cool, 221 Pa. 622. (1908)

See also Schrager vs.
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MOOT COURT
HOMER v. PERRY
Ejectment-Codicil-Revocation of a Portion of an Existfng Will
When a Codicil Provides for Revocation of part of a Will and
Does not Provide for Redistribution of all the Property Covered in the first Will the Part Left unprovided for is Distributed According to the Intestate Laws.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The father of James Homer, plaintiff, devised his farm as
follows: one-fourth to his son James, and the other three-fourths
to the sons of a deceased son, Henry. Subsequently however he
made a codicil in which he revoked the gift to his son James.
In this suit the plaintiff, James Homer, claims one-half of the
farm against Perry, defendant; the grantee of the three children
of the deceased son Henry. The plaintiff in this action seeks to
set aside the original will of his father on account of the codicil
which cuts him off from the estate given him by the original will.
OPINION OF THE LOWER COURT
WARFIELD, J. We can find nothing in this case which
bears out the plaintiff's contentions. The codicil revokes the gift
and there is no argument, as there might have been, as to the sufficiency of the words in the codicil to revoke the provisions of the
original will. The argument of the plaintiff's counsel that the
law does not permit a man uncared for is not well taken nor is
the law of this state relied on by him for confirmation. The
law requires that if a man makes no mention whatever of his
son and it is apparent that the lack of provision is an oversightthen the decedent shall be deemed to have died intestate. Here
there is a definite, valid, mention and disbarrment of the son,
James. The facts as shown do not state whether Homer made
any other provisions for the one quarter originally given to James,
or not. If he made no other provisions, James may apply,
through the proper channels for his proper share of that part of
the estate not provided for; as the law requires such parts of estates not otherwise provided for to be distributed according to
the Intestate Act.
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Had the plaintiff shown that the son, James, had lived on
the farm, as owner or part owner, or that he had had an interest
in the farm of such a nature as to imply that he knew of his
father's original intention, a direct and conclusive revocation in
the codicil would have been necessary, and for anyone having
such an interest this Court would tend to construe the will in his
favor. SiegeFs Estate, 213 Pa. 14; Manner's Est., 22 C. C. 577.
But here the plaintiff chose no such method and we find nothing
in his case which justifies us in breaking the will of the older
Homer, good in form and clear in intention as it is. The will is
Homer, Senior's. He had a right to do as he would with his property. All other things being equal, we have no choice but to uphold and carry out, if necessary his wishes.
Judgment accordingly.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
Homer had had two sons, James and Henry. Henry had
died, leaving three children. Under the Intestate Act, James
would have taken one-half of Homer's land, and the three children of Henry would each have taken one-sixth.
Homer has the power, by will, to cldiange the shares of his
children and grandchildren. He could, as he did reduce James'
interest from a half to a fourth.
Subsequently, Homer made a codicil by which he did not
alter the shares of his grandchildren, but did revoke the gift of
one-quarter to James. What becomes of that quarter? It is
clear that Homer has not disposed of it by his will. As to it, then,
he has died intestate. It follows that James is entitled, under
the intestate laws to one-half of this fourth or one-eighth, and
that the other half passes to the three children of Henry.
James in the ejectment, should recover only one-eighth from
the grantee of the children of Henry. Zarner v. Zarner, 265
Pa. 175. It may be that this is the result reached by the learned
court below. On the assumption that it is, the judgment is affirmed.
KEEGAN v. BALDWIN
Real Estate Broker-A Broker Cannot be the Agent for Both
Vendor, and Vendee, in the Absence of an Express Agreement Between Them-Double Commission-Agency.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Action for commission for procuring a purchaser of a house.
Baldwin employed Keegan to find a purchaser, although he knew
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at the time that X, whom he found, and to whom Baldwin conveyed the house, had already employed Keegan to find a suitable house which he could buy. No rate of compensation was
agreed upon. The plaintiff called witnesses to show the usual
commission in the locality of the parties. Verdict for $80.00,
the price of the house being $2000.00.
Stapleton, for Plaintiff.
Coglizer, for defendant.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
BASHORE, J. The facts of this case present a question
which in the opinion of the court is well settled in Pennsylvania.
May an agent recover compensation from a principal when
the principal had knowledge of the Agent's employment by the'
adverse party?
Baldwin employed Keegan to find a purchaser though he
knew when he employed him that X had already employed him
to find a suitable house. These facts make it evident that Keegan was the agent of X and the agent of Baldwin. "If the Agent
of two adverse principals is honest, the utmost he can do is to be
impartial but impartiality is exactly the qualification which is
inconsistent with agency; the agent is chosen to be a partisan
of his principal, not an impartial arbitrator between him and
someone else. British Am. Assn. Co., 6 Colo. 25; 2 C. J., 713.
Keegan being the agent of both Baldwin and X lacked a qualification necessary in an agent, that of partiality for his principal.
The general rule applicable to cases of double agency is
that a person may not be the agent for both contracting parties
at the same time. 2 C. J., 448. This rule seems to be very
flexible and is applicable to all cases except where there is
knowledge and consent of both parties. 2 C. J., 712. Everhart
v. Searle. V. Pa. 256; 2 Sup. 60. The reason for the extension of
the rule is on the grounds of public policy "in order to remove
from the agent all temptation to neglect his principal's interest."
2 C. J., 695; 12 L. R. A. 395; Penna. Ry. Co. v. Flannigan, 3
Cent. Rep. 599; 26 W. N. C. 405; 142 Pa. 25; 185 Pa. 536.
The counsel for the appellee contends that since the agent
could not use any discretion the rule is not applicable. However
we find from the facts an actual employment by X and by Baldwin, the one giving authority to purchase and the other the authority to sell-an agent receiving such authority, without qualification, certainly is given as a necessary incident the power to
use his discretion. If the fact of direction was vital to the case
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we find that the agent Keegan had discretion.
It is further
contended that Keegan was employed only to bring the parties
together, but the facts referred to above amply show that Keegan was made the agent of both parties.
The general rule alluded to was established in Everhart V.
Searle, 71 Pa. 256, where authority for the establishment of the
rule was obtained from Holy Writ. Flagg employed Searle to
sell the land, the compensation to be all above $125 per acre.
Everhart agreed in writing with Searle to pay him $500 for services in a~sisting to negotiate a purchase of the land. Searle
brought Everhart and Flagg together and a contract was made
for the sale of the land at $150 per acre. Everhart and Searle
afterwards consummated the sale themselves. "We have the authority of Holy Writ for saying that 'No man can serve two masters; for either he will hate the one and love the other; or else
he will hold to the one and despise the other.'" The court holding in this case that Searle acting for both without their consent
could not recover the $500 from Everhart. This doctrine is supported by a wealth of Pa. cases. 112 Pa. 565; 136 Pa. 442; 142
Pa. 32; 154 Pa. 330; 185 Pa. 544; 196 Pa. 209; 262 Pa. 61; 59
Sup. 95; 62 Sup. 404; 28 Sup. 209; 7 Dist. 759.
The establishment of the general rule brings us to consider
the vital question in this case. Did the fact of Baldwin's knowledge take the case out of the rule and so permit Keegan to recover?
We must answer this question negatively.
We find the rule governing this point to be well stated in
Vol. 1 P. & L. Dig. 486, "An agent cannot create relations which
will place him in an attitude of hostility to his principal nor act
as agent for two principals whose interests are adverse without
the express consent of both. 22 Pa. 320. This has been further
amplified so that consent of both employers to double service
must not only be obtained but also consent of both to double compensation. Vol. 3 P. & L. Dig. "C. R. A.," 69; 32 Sup. 60; 54
Sup. 189.
Is the fact of knowledge by one of the principals sufficient
to create a waiver of the express consent? "The mere fact that
the principal had knowledge that the agent was also acting for the
other party without any consent thereto, will not enable the agent
to recover compensation."
2 C. J. 763; Law v. Billington, 180
Pa. 84. Though the agent told the principal he was acting for
the adverse party is not sufficient to act as a waiver, in the absence of an express agreement to a waiver. 43 Sup. 635; 136 Pa.
439; 112 Pa. 558; 154 Pa. 326; 32 Sup. 60; 32 Sup. 365. The case
in Penna. which establishes the principal in this case is that of
Rice v. Davis, 136 Pa. 439. The fact that the principal knew of
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the agent's receipt of compensation from the purchaser did not
constitute a waiver of the rule and preserve the right of the agent
to be compensated by the vendor. The court in this case holding
"Nothing short of clear and satisfactory proof of an express
agreement to do so should be regarded as sufficient proof of the
waiver of the rule of public policy that a man cannot serve two
masters." "He had a right to be silent even if he knew that the
plaintiff had undertaken to serve two masters and intended to
claim compensation from both." 20 A. & R. 925; 2 P. & L. Dig.
2230, 32; 20 Atl. Rep. 513; 154 Pa. 330; 173 Pa. 99; 185 Pa. 544;
196 Pa. 208; 13 Sup. 575. That an express agreement is required
before there will be a waiver of the rule was held in 70 Sup. 345,
where such an agreement was made.
The rule is further extended so that commissions having been
paid, can be recovered on proof that the agent acted for both vendor and vendee. 2 P. & L. Dig. 2229, 28; 142 Pa. 25.
The conclusion reached by us makes it unnecessary to consider the question of the rate of compensation.
In view of the law as stated above the verdict must be set
aside and judgment rendered for the appellant.
Judgment reversed.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
No man can serve tvo masters, when the interests of these
masters which he is to promote demand inconsistent things. If
the price of Baldwin's home was to be dependent on negotiations
with the buyer, as the buyer would want to obtain it at a low
price, honest service of him would be inconsistent with the interest of Baldwin.
Even if the price of the house was to be the result of
negotiations, we think that the maxim which condenms an agency
by the same man, for both vendor and vendee, not applicable if
both parties know all the facts. Adult men, not in the charge of
committees for infancy, or lunacy, or weak-mindedness, must be
allowed to employ whom they will to serve them, in whatever
business, and therefore, to employ the same person, if each knows
that he is likewise serving the other.
If we understand the case, Baldwin had himself fixed the
price of the house, $2,000. Keegan had no discretion with respect
to it. He was to find anyone he could, who would pay $2000, and
having found one, bring him to Baldwin. The fact that Keegan
had been employed by X to find a house, has no importance, so
far as Baldwin was concerned. So far as Keegan was concerned,
it might. X may have wanted a suitable house at the lowest
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price at which it could be secured. Keegan having in prospect a
reward for selling Baldwin's house, might have concealed from
X purchasable houses more eligible, on account of price or otherwise, which he could have discovered and recommended.
While then, no injury has been done to Baldwin by X's employment of the same agent, an injury may have been done to
X. It would be contrary to a sound policy to compel the performance of a contract with Baldwin, which contract contravened
the interests of X.
While Baldwin knew of X's employment of Keegan, it does
not appear that X knew of his employment by Baldwin.
That
should appear, to make the contract with Baldwin enforceable.
Commending the thoroughness of the investigations of the
learned court below, we accept its decision.
Affirmed.

